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Abstract—This paper presents the fusion of two subdomains of digital forensics: (1) raw memory analysis and (2)
approximate matching. Specifically, this paper describes a
prototype implementation named MRSH-MEM that allows to
compare hard drive images as well as memory dumps and
therefore can answer the question if a particular program
(installed on a hard drive) is currently running / loaded
in memory. To answer this question, we only require both
dumps or access to a public repository which provides the
binaries to be tested. For our prototype, we modified an
existing approximate matching algorithm named MRSH-NET
and combined it with approxis, an approximate disassembler.
Recent literature claims that approximate matching techniques
are slow and hardly applicable to the field of memory forensics.
Especially legitimate changes to executables in memory caused
by the loader itself prevent the application of current bytewise
approximate matching techniques. Our approach lowers the
impact of modified code in memory and shows a good computational performance. During our experiments, we show how
an investigator can leverage meaningful insights by combining
data gained from a hard disk image and raw memory dumps
with a practicability runtime performance. Lastly, our current
implementation will be integrable into the volatility memory
forensics framework and we introduce new possibilities for
providing data driven cross validation functions. Our current
proof of concept implementation supports Linux based raw
memory dumps.
Keywords-Memory analysis, Forensic analysis, Approximate
matching, Fuzzy hashing

I. I NTRODUCTION
Over the past years memory became very affordable and
most machines currently have 8 GB, 16 GB or even 32 GB of
memory. As a consequence, software (benign and malicious)
often operates in memory only, e.g., non persistent malware
only exists in memory. Understanding and being able to
analyze memory can give forensic investigators valuable and
meaningful insights into a running system. The community
and industry came up with different solutions for the analysis
of acquired memory dumps which fall into one of two major
categories:
•

Interpretation of structures: Most tools and frameworks utilize structured analysis, i.e., the software
interprets the complex system related structures, where

•

two well known memory forensic suites are Rekall1 and
Volatility2 . In detail, the frameworks deal with different
formats of acquisition, the concepts of virtual memory
management, the underlying architecture and the operating system related structures. Memory profiles are
used to close the semantic gap and enable to perform
such a structural examination. The examination with
structured analysis techniques also yields new ways
of evasion, which are encountered by examining and
correlating different sources of OS related structures.
Memory carving: There are also tools for unstructured
analysis to extract information out of memory dumps.
Those tools are important for different tasks like string
or key extraction [7]. Carving memory has the major
advantages of being more robust against malicious
evasion or domain specific deallocations of important
structures. In addition, those tasks can achieve a high
IO throughput, are good parallelizable and offer a fast
access to valuable insights. With the increasing size of
memory, methods of data reduction (similar to those
for hard drive forensics) are needed [30].

A core task of memory forensics is the enumeration of
running or already terminated processes. The task of identifying processes in memory dumps is well discussed and
different solutions have been proposed. Memory forensic
frameworks and commercial software products interpret the
structures of the operating system, which are responsible
for process management, execution and allocations. The
correlation of different characteristics during memory analysis is also denoted as cross validation, which empowers
to detect malicious activities, e.g., a process with partially
implemented evasion features. Infection vectors based on
injection, process possession or the simple reuse of benign
process names require additional steps of investigation.
Beside malicious manipulations, legitimate alterations or
deallocations by the operating system itself could also hinder
a structural examination. This fact motivates to explore datadriven analysis techniques, i.e., memory based carving.
1 https://github.com/google/rekall

(last accessed 2018-02-10).
(last accessed 2018-02-

2 https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility

10).

In the course of binary (malware) analysis, different
techniques have been proposed to identify and compare code
related structures. As those two steps barely describe the
process of memory carving, we mention them in their respective fields of application. The interpretation of statistical
structures showed promising results to classify malware [1]
or to identify code [32]. Additional steps of processing and
feature extraction can encounter obfuscation or variances
[18, 28]. The application of feature hashing [15, 16] or
the compression based comparison [24, 25] also showed
promising results for clustering and classification. Cohen
and Havrilla proposed the reduction of shared code by
normalizing and hashing disassembled code on a function
level. Jin et al. extended the approach by the utilization of locality sensitive hashing and semantic hashes. Assembly code
clone search detection systems have been proposed to detect
similarities between malicious code samples [10, 11, 26].
Most of the mentioned approaches utilize statistical properties of the instruction sequences itself. They are discussed
within the scope of processing executable code in a file
context and not in the scope of carving file fragments contained within a raw memory dump, which bares additional
pitfalls and considerations. As some of those techniques
showed promising results in related fields of application, we
leave the question unanswered if all of those approaches are
adoptable for memory forensics. We further describe our
field of application and its restrictions in Section III-A.
In the field of memory forensics signature-based analysis
has been recently adopted [9]. The research underlines
the idiosyncrasies, pitfalls and needed adaptations to apply
signatures to this domain. On the other hand, [29, 30]
proposed the utilization of cryptographic hash functions to
perform code integrity checks, tamper detection, and do
white- or blacklisting. The authors discuss the process of
whitelisting normalized executables on a page level with the
help of a golden image baseline. The work emphasize the
obstacle changes caused even by the loader itself. Garfinkel
and McCarrin presented an approach that covers the main
considerations and pitfalls of our work in general terms. In
contrary to a whole-file hashing, a concept called hash-based
carving was introduced, which can identify files that are
fragmented, files that are incomplete, or files that have been
partially modified. The publication covers similar aspects
of our work within a general scope. We propose the usage
approximate matching techniques for solving this task in the
domain of process-related memory forensics and outline our
choice in Section V.
In this work we present a novel approach that allows
detecting similarities between software stored on hard drives
and loaded as modules into memory (Linux only). For
processing the physical memory dumps and for damping possible loading-traces, we rely on approxis [20]
an approximate disassembler performing carving of coderelated structures. To compare the content of the dumps with

the content of hard drives, we borrowed concepts from a
subdomain of digital forensics called approximate matching.
In a nutshell, these algorithms can be used to find similarities
between different digital objects (e.g., compare the similarity
between two text documents; details see Sec. II-B). We
consider our approach as robust for memory based carving of
code related fragments, as our implementation relies on the
possibly scattered code structures itself. Thus, our approach
does not depend on critical system related structures, the
manual adaptation of signatures or the specification of
any alignment properties. Using approximate matching for
memory forensics is not new and was already discussed
where most researchers questioned the applicability and
runtime efficiency of those algorithms [9, 30, 22]. We
discuss the application of approximate matching in the scope
memory carving and release a prototype implementation
which shows good computational performance. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first usable implementation
of an approximate matching technique, which integrates an
additional step of disassembling.
In detail, we introduce a derivative of a particular approximate matching algorithm (MRSH-NET3 ) and present
MRSH-MEM which allows to detect fragments of code in the
course of white- or blacklisting. Our paper has the following
contributions:
• We interface approximate matching with an additional
layer of approximate disassembling to process physical memory which is accomplished by integrating
a recently published disassembler approxis into
MRSH-NET.
• We demonstrate the capabilities of our approach to
identify code structures in large amounts of raw data by
the extraction of allocable code sections from different
resources (e.g., online repositories or hard disk images).
• We demonstrate an acceptable runtime performance
for processing memory dumps with a reasonable and
realistic size.
• Besides our prototype implementation, we demonstrate
a first application to identify kernel structures in memory, i.e., we profile the current running Kernel version
inside a previously acquired raw memory dump.
• Lastly, we show the detection of code fragments of a
running process in User Memory Space and show the
capabilities to identify the currently running version.
• We publish our current proof of concept implementation4 and will outline steps of further improvements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II we formally introduce the Linux memory management system, the properties of approximate matching and the
3 Note, MRSH-NET originated from the MRSH-family which has other
derivations like MRSH-v2. The overall procedure of all approaches is very
similar and therefore will will only talk about MRSH-NET for simplicity
reasons.
4 https://github.com/dasec/approximate-memory

recently published approximate disassembler approxis.
In Section III we introduce our approach, its functionality
and its basic layers of processing. Section IV discusses
some practical applications and the possible integration into
structured analysis. In Section V we introduce existing
research, which focuses on physical memory examination.
In Section VI we conclude our findings and finally introduce
some further extensions to our current proof of concept
implementation in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we will introduce some memory management techniques of the Linux operating system, core
functionalities of approximate matching algorithms and a
recently introduced technique of approximate disassembling.
The introduced foundations have to be considered in the following sections and play an important role in the remainder
of this work.
A. Linux Virtual Memory Management
The next few paragraphs outline the Linux memory
management from a high level few; this is by far not a
complete description which would be beyond of scope for
this paper. We will summarize some core primitives of
the virtual memory management (VMM) as well as some
important peculiarities of the Linux memory management.
The knowledge of some fundamentals are indispensable for
understanding further parameter settings and demonstrated
use cases.
Linux implements the concept of VMM, which introduces
a layer of indirection and maps one Virtual to one or more
Physical addresses in RAM. This has two major benefits:
First, each process can have its own address space, which
improves process separation and security (the memory of
other processes stays hidden). The second advantage is
the possibility to swap out memory to hard disk and to
store it independent of its underlying physical scheme. A
process can share fragments with other processes to reduce
the occupied physical memory. The concept called shared
memory therefore maps physical memory, which could be
used by different processes at the same time, into each of
those processes. Thus, the physical memory gets mapped
into multiple processes at once, as long as the fragments
are not changed by a process. As soon as a process changes
the shared memory area, the changed version gets copied
into a independent memory area for the process itself (copy
on write). The memory mappings could be additionally
equipped with access permissions, which controls the access
for reading, writing or executing memory. The mapping is
performed with the help of the Memory Management Unit,
which links the CPU with the memory itself. The Translation
Lookaside Buffer implements a system for fast buffering.
The virtual address space is split into an upper part
and lower part also named Kernel Space and User

Space, respectively. The border of this split is denoted as
CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET and differs for different architectures and systems. For instance, on a 32-bit system the
offset is normally at address 0xC0000000. Given that the
Kernel address space is above CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET
it would be 1 GB of a 4 GB system. On 64-bit systems this offsets varies by architecture, e.g., common boundaries are ARM=0x8000000000000000 and
x86_64=0xffff880000000000. Focusing on the upper
part (the Kernel space), there is usually another separation
as shown in Figure 1.
We could roughly differ the Kernel Address Space in
three different areas: Kernel Logical Address Space, Kernel
Virtual Address Space and the User Virtual Address Space.
Note, the definitions and wordings slightly differ across
sources and literature. The User Space is located below the
defined PAGE_OFFSET and stores the user space programs,
where each process manages its own mappings. Not all
portions of the process need to be loaded and mapped to
memory until they are actually needed. The memory is
mapped to Physical Address Space in a non-contiguous
fashion. In case of high memory usage, the fragments of
memory can be additionally swapped to hard disk and moved
inside the Physical Address Space. It should be clear, that
the User Space is unsuitable for Direct Memory Access.
The Kernel Logical Addresses (Low Memory) are stored
about the PAGE_OFFSET and are contiguously mapped
with a fixed offset to the Physical Address Space. The area
itself can never be swapped on hard disk and thus could
be used for DMA. The address space above the Kernel
Logical Addresses contain the so called Kernel Virtual
Addresses (High Memory). This address space is mapped
with non-contiguous memory mappings and unsuitable for
DMA transfers.
The Kernel Address Space starts with the mappings of
the Linux Kernel and its allocated segments. Above, the
loaded vmlinux image, the Loadable Kernel Modules are
located. A Loadable Kernel Module is defined in the ELF
(Executable and Linking Format) format and can be invoked
to a running system. In the file system a LKM is normally
denoted with the .ko extension and those modules provide
a broad variety of extensions to a running system. They are
also to be known as often attacked by malicious kernel-level
rootkits.
The mapping between the virtual and the physical space
is handled by the Memory Management Unit which operates
on memory pages (i.e., it maps one or multiple virtual pages
to one physical page). Thus, a page is a fixed size allocation
of virtual memory, which is aligned to this size in memory.
The size of a page can vary for different architectures as
shown in Table I and is set during the kernel build time.
We will not describe the concept of page tables, the
functionality of TLB and the translation process itself, as
this would be out of the scope of this work. Additionally the
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Architecture
ARM
ARM64
MIPS
x86

Simpliﬁed Linux Memory Address Layout

Page Size
4 KB
4 KB or 64 KB
Conﬁgurable
4 KB

Table I
OVERVIEW OF COMMON PAGE SIZES .

concept of Shared Memory, Lazy Allocation and (Kernel)
Address Layout Randomization will not be described in this
paper. However, we need to consider several implications
caused by the above mentioned concepts as those concepts
strongly differ from normally processed data of approximate
matching techniques. We summarized the concepts and formalized general implications, which should be respected in
our approach. After the introduction of some core primitives
of approximate matching and approximate disassembling,
we will give a comprehensive overview of our considerations
in Subsection III-A.
B. Approximate Matching
Approximate matching (a.k.a. Fuzzy hashing or similarity
(digest) hashing) is a rather new area of digital forensics and
can be seen as the counterpart to traditional (cryptographic)
hash functions, i.e., approximate matching algorithms return

similar ﬁngerprints for similar inputs. In the following we
summarized the most important aspects; more comprehensive overviews are provided by [3] and [14]. From a high
level perspective, approximate matching algorithms work as
follow. First, the algorithm identiﬁes features where a feature
is usually a substring of the complete input (e.g., chunks of
a particular length). These chunks are then shortened which
is often done using (cryptographic) hash functions. Lastly,
these shorter strings are then used to build a ﬁngerprint /
similarity digest.
For instance, let us have a closer look at algorithms
for the MRSH family which form the basis for this work.
These algorithms (e.g., [5]) consider only the underlying
byte sequence of a given input (no interpretation of the byte
sequence). The given sequence is divided into chunks of
size b (common values are 64 ≤ b ≤ 320 bytes) . To do
so, the algorithm uses a sliding window that rolls through
the sequence byte-by-byte and considers 7 consecutive bytes
at a time. This window is then hashed using a pseudo
random function (PRF) which returns a value between 0
and b. If b == 0, the end of a chunk is identiﬁed. As a
consequence, if PRF behaves pseudo random, each chunk
has approximately the size b bytes. Once the end of a chunk
is identiﬁed, a Chunk Hash Function (CHF) is used to
compress the sequence (common CHFs are MD5, SHA or
FNV-1a). Lastly, all chunk hashes are translated into a ﬁnal

fingerprint where different algorithms use different concepts.
In case of MRSH-NET, a single large Bloom filter is used
which is explained in the following paragraph
A Bloom filter is a space-efficient, probabilistic data
structured invented by Burton Howard Bloom in 1970 [2]
that consists of an array of m bits all set to zero. In order to
insert an element s ∈ S into a Bloom filter, s is hashed using
a hash function that returns values |h(s)| ≥ k·log2 (m) bits5 .
Then, the first log2 (m) bits are used to set the corresponding
bit in the Bloom filter; the second log2 (m) bits are used
to set the corresponding bit in the Bloom filter; this is
repeated k times. For instance, assuming Bloom filter size
m = 64 = 26 and k = 2, h(s) should return a hash value of
at least (2 · log2 (64) =) 12 bits, e.g., 011011 101101. Given
that 011011bin = 27dec and 101101bin = 45dec , bits 27
and 45 of the Bloom filter are set to one. To verify whether
an element s0 is in a given Bloom filter, it is hashed with
the same hash function h. If all corresponding bits in the
Bloom filter are set to one, the element was inserted into
the Bloom filter with a certain probability (there is a chance
for a false positive). If one of the bits is zero, the element
was never inserted into the Bloom filter (there are not false
negatives). Specifically, the false positive rate of a Bloom
filter is influenced by three parameters: the size of the filter
m, the amount of elements which are inserted into the filter
n and the number of set bits per element k. The probability
for a false positive can then be estimated with the formulas
illustrated in Eq. 1

PF P =

kn !k 

k
1
≈ 1 − e−kn/m
1− 1−
m

= (1 − p)k , with
kn

1
,
p=1− 1−
m

(1)

where p is the probability of a bit being 0, after all n
elements have been inserted.
In order to create the final fingerprint, the first k·log2 (m)
bits of the chunk hashes are utilized to set the corresponding
bits in the Bloom filter. In other words, for each chunk k
bits are set in the Bloom filter. A summary of the parameters
is provided in Table II.
The created fingerprints can be used to estimate the similarity score between two given files. Different approximate
matching approaches create different fingerprints and thus
utilize different techniques for similarity calculation. In the
course of MRSH derivatives which utilize Bloom filters as
similarity digest, the Hamming distance as metric is used.
In the course of this work, we adopt approximate matching
5 Note,

the original work suggests to use k different hash functions each
returning a value between 0 and m − 1. However, we use a single hash
functions and therefore our explanation differs slightly.

b
m
n
k

Denotes the approximated chunk size
Denotes the Bloom filter size in bits
Number of elements inserted into a Bloom filter
Number of used sub-hashes; each sets a bit in the
corresponding Bloom filter
Table II
PARAMETERS OF MRSH-NET AND THEIR

DESCRIPTION .

to identify chunks within an acquired memory dump. Similar
to MRSH-NET, we can not expect a present file context
when comparing extracted chunks against a database of
files. We leave the question of better lookup strategies and
chunk identification techniques open for further research.
We discuss the details of our provisional solution to identify
chunks in Section IV.
C. Approximate Disassembling
approxis is a fast approximate disassembler for unknown instruction sequences that was presented by Liebler
and Baier [20] in 2017. In contrast to traditional linear sweep
or recursive traversal approaches, approxis does not provide a full instruction decoding but focuses on computational
efficiency which is accomplished using a pre-generated
prefix tree. Note, we will use the terms of disassembling and
decoding interchangeably in this paper. This was inspired by
existing applications, like the distorm6 stream disassembler.
However, in contrast to distorm, approxis is less granular
and does not operate on a bit level during disassembling an
instruction.
Specifically, Liebler and Baier use a large ground-truth
dataset of ELF files to generate a prefix tree (a.k.a. trie7 )
as simplified in Figure 2. All files in the corpus are parsed
(e.g., the input byte sequence) and put into a trie structure
where the focus lies on the mnemonics. For instance, 0x41
indicates a push and given that it is the ground truth it
is known that the next byte (0x55) also belongs to the
current instruction. Focusing on the next offset starting
with 0x48, it is known that 0x48 can be lea, sub
or mov and therefore the next byte (0x89) needs to be
considered as well which then indicates a mov. Since the
authors are only interested in approximate disassembling,
approxis does not store the nodes and leaves colored
in whited. Instead, the black colored decision node stores
the representative mnemonic and the remaining length of
the current instruction (length not shown in the figure). For
instance, the black 0x64 would have stored a remaining
instruction length of ‘2’. In the original trie implementation
a lot of additional information is saved within each node:
Frequency counts, most common instruction lengths, most
6 https://github.com/gdabah/distorm/wiki/diStormInternals (last accessed
2018-02-10).
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trie (last accessed 2018-02-10).

common mnemonic and several other information about
the currently processed instructions. Those additional counts
will be helpful for further statistical analysis described in the
upcoming paragraphs. In order to disassemble an unknown
ELF file, approxis parses the file and perform look ups
in the trie. For instance, let us assume the byte sequence
in Figure 2 is unknown. The opcode 0x41 55 will be
translated into the mnemonic push 2 (as the approach is
interested in the mnemonic and the length only). Given the
same trie, the opcode 0x41 87 would end up in the identical
mnemonic.
Obviously, not all byte sequences are decodable by the
trie structure. For example, a sequence 0x48 ff e0 48 8d
will stop at the undecidable intermediate node 0x48 as
its successor 0xff is not present in the trie. To continue,
the additional information (stored in the node) is utilized,
e.g., frequency analysis of common instruction sequences
and subsequent mnemonics. For the example in Figure 2
(right side), subsequent mnemonics would be [push,mov],
[mov,sub], [sub,lea] and [lea,mov].
Based on these frequencies that are calculated over the
complete ground truth corpus, the authors generate a confidence score λ which describes if two disassembled and
subsequent instructions are plausible or not. In detail, the
instructions are extracted as bigrams from the ELF ground
truth and for each of those the probability p is saved
as absolute logarithmic odds (logit). Coming back to the
problem of the unknown byte (see Figure 3), the confidence
score allows to predict the length of the instruction (i.e.,
where to continue the approximate disassembling). Precisely,
0xff is unknown and hence approxis does not know the
length of the instruction. The algorithm depicts successively
a candidate from the previously saved and most frequently
occurred lengths. If the disassembler has success at a corresponding offset, the value of confidence counterchecks
if the sequence of instructions is meaningful or not. In
our example, the high confidence score (i.e., λ = 17)
indicates that 0xe0 is most likely not a mnemonic and
therefore the algorithm jumps to 0x48 8d which can be
found in the try. Applying approxis on byte sequences
that do not contain code fragments, the values of confidence
will indicate that this snippet is nonsense. This behavior
empowers to distinguish between fragments of code and
data. Large blocks of continually similar byte sequences
could lead to a wrong interpretation. An example could be
long sequences of zero (0x00) padding bytes, which would
be misleadingly decoded to an add instruction. To avoid this
behavior the current implementation makes use of a running
length counter, which penalizes and ignores such repeating
sequences.
In the current implementation of approxis, the decoded
instructions, the decoded instruction lengths and the determined values of confidence (λ) are stored in separated
buffers. During the decoding of the input bytes the buffers

store at the same offsets the corresponding informations of
a specific sequence.
The buffers are listed in Table III. The raw image buffer
buf_by with size INPUT_SIZE contains the raw byte
sequence of an input stream (e.g. file, memory dump).
The processing buffers can be adjusted manually by setting the corresponding parameter BUFFER_SIZE. The
buffers contain decoded relative offsets of the instructions
(buf_ro), the decoded (integerized) mnemonics of the instructions (buf_mn) and the values of local code confidence
(buf_lo).
In the following paragraph we will summarize some
major considerations. It should be clear that the field of
application is not related to extended binary analysis and
thus, the disassembler is not and should not be capable to
proceed a full decoding of a present complex instruction
set. The process should interface the steps of processing
provided by MRSH-NET. The motivation and application of
approximate disassembling is described in [20]. To summarize the characteristics of an approximate disassembler, we
don’t actually need a full decoding and only focus on the
correct determination of instruction offsets and a mnemonic
represent. We apply the disassembler on large amounts of
raw data and do not expect a well formed executable with
reasonable header information as input. The disassembler
is applied in the field of memory analysis and not able
to actually resolve virtual addresses. With the values of
confidence the disassembler is able to discriminate between
code and data. Additionally, approxis could differentiate
the architecture of the code instructions [20].
III. A PPROACH
As previously mentioned, this article presents MRSH-MEM
which is a combination of approxis and an approximate matching algorithm MRSH-NET. The main goal is
the possible comparison of memory images and hard-drive
content, e.g., applications installed on the system and currently executed in memory. This will allow investigators to
profile parts of the memory dump (whitelisting) or detect
suspicious code patterns inside the memory dump (blacklisting). The proposed approach therefore enables to perform
robust unstructured analysis of a memory dump. A strongly
generalized overview of our use case is shown in Figure 4.
The lefthand side outlines the already existing approximate
matching techniques. The opposite side is the content of this
article, i.e., how to modify / normalize a memory image so
that we can generate a fingerprint / memory digest which
then can be compared against a traditional approximate
matching fingerprint.
A. Considerations
Before discussing our approach, we highlight some considerations which impacted our design decisions. In Section II we gave a brief introduction into the concepts of
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Oversimplified disassembling process with the help of a byte-trie structure.

Buffer

Size

Type

Description

buf_by

INPUT_SIZE

uint8 t

Stores the input file or stream, so it contains the raw bytes.

buf_lo

BUFFER_SIZE

uint8 t

Stores the value of confidence for two subsequent instructions.

buf_wi

BUFFER_SIZE

uint8 t

Stores the averaged confidence for WINDOW_SIZE instructions.

buf_ro

BUFFER_SIZE

uint8 t

Stores the relative offset of a instruction at the current offset.

buf_pe

BUFFER_SIZE

uint8 t

Stores the penalty value at a current offset.

buf_mn

BUFFER_SIZE

uint32 t

Stores the decoded mnemonic for a specific instruction.

Table III
U SED BUFFERS OF THE CURRENT A P P R O X I S

λi = 7
41

55

48

λi+3 = 4

λi+2 = 5
89

f3

48

ff

e0

48

8d

λi+3 = 17
Figure 3. If the process of disassembling struggles, reasonable offsets
could be selected by the examination of the saved values of confidence for
different bigrams.

Virtual Memory Management, approximate matching and
approximate disassembling. In the following listing we conclude some considerations, which have to be respected for
processing raw physical memory:
I. Mappings of virtually contiguous regions do not
have to be physically contiguous.
The fact that pages of a specific context do not have to
be allocated contiguously in memory, is an important
issue for the overall concept of transferring approximate
matching to the field of memory forensics. Found
features should be considered in a page-sized scope.
This should lead to future research and concepts of
composing separated page sizes.
II. The page size can vary for different architectures
and pages are aligned to its page size in memory.
We expect the page size to be at least 4 KB which is
the most common page size. This is important when
selecting the block size b as it should be smaller
than the page size. Explanation: a large b will reduce
the amount of chunks within a page boundary of a

INTEGRATION .

physical memory dump. Considering non-contiguous
physical pages, this could lead to producing features,
that frequently overlap with neighboring pages (all
details about b are discussed in Section III-D).
III. Pages could be shared between processes, thus a
physical could refer to multiple virtual pages but
not the other way round. The concept is also called
Shared Memory.
This concept outlines, that virtual to physical mapping
is actually not a one to one mapping. Especially in the
case of shared libraries, it should be clear that those
matches could not actually resolve a specific sample.
Even if this is yet out of the scope of this work, we
should consider it in further proceedings.
IV. Each process context uses its own virtual mapping.
We are not able to actually resolve the physical
offset of a virtual address without translation or
the analysis of system related structures.
Our overall approach of processing is context unaware.
Thus, we are not able to actually resolve a virtual
reference. It should be clear, that examination on a
higher level, e.g. the usage of recursive traversal or
control flow graph analysis, are not applicable in a
context unaware scenario.
V. Not all requested pages of a process are allocated
immediately. The concept is also called Lazy Allocation.
In contrary to traditional hard drive forensics, the
looked up data sample has not to be present in RAM
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completely during acquisition. We should consider this
fact during examination of found chunks inside a target
image.
VI. In case of high memory usage, the kernel is able
to swap content to hard disk, which is denoted as
Swapping.
Similar to Lazy Allocations, this concept should raise
our awareness, that we should not expect a sample (i.e.
in the case of loaded executables) which is fully loaded
to memory at the time of acquisition.
VII. We expect systems with 8 GB RAM to represent a
reasonable upper bound for current consumer PC
systems.
Similar to previous publications, which have determined the required Bloom filter size for their field
of application, we should determine the maximum
required size for storing memory dumps. Even if it is
common, that most of the acquired memory should be
initialized with zero byte paddings anyways, we assume
this value as possible upper bound, in case the acquired
memory is well populated.
VIII. Executables are changed during the process of
loading to memory.
Code on a hard disk should differ from its representation in memory. Legitimate changes to code would
obviously cause the original fuzzy hashing techniques
to fail. The PRF and CHF would possibly interpret
even legitimate updates to the code structures. The
possible pitfalls of applying traditional fuzzy hashes are
twofold. First, the process of chunk extraction could
be disturbed, as the PRF could trigger at different
offsets. Second, the hash value of a extracted chunk
could differ, as the CHF works on a byte-level of
unnormalized code fragments.

is hard to visualize the exact flow. A description of the steps
depicted in the figure is given in the following (step one and
two are nearly unmodified steps presented by Liebler and
Baier [20]):
¶ The raw bytes from the memory are disassembled using
approxis as discussed in Sec. II-C which will return
the mnemonic as well as the length of the instruction.
Especially the decoded mnemonic is important for
further proceedings as the process of chunk extraction
and chunk hashing.
· Using the confidence score λ and the concept of a
simple running length counter allows to differentiate
between code and data. The running lenght counter
counts repeating mnemonics, e.g., a nop-slide, which
should not be considered. Note, for our approach we
will focus on code and neglect data.
¸ Having the approximate disassembled code, we now
identify the chunk boundaries based on the mnemonics.
Therefore, we utilize a sliding window approach on
the mnemonics (precisely, the rolling hash runs over a
C-buffer that contains the byte representations of the
mnemonics). All details are provided in Sec. III-C.
¹ After identifying all chunks, an additional filter is applied to remove irrelevant chunks. To identify relevant
chunks, we utilize the confidence score. For instance,
the first three entries form chunk one (indicated by C1 )
have a high confidence score (64, 64, 63), therefore we
consider this chunk as not relevant (indicated by [0]).
º Lastly, the relevant chunks will be hashed and stored
into a database. While this example focused on creating
a chunk hash based on the mnemonic buffer, we can
utilize other buffers as well for further comparisons,
e.g., the raw byte buffer.

B. Data Processing

C. Implementation Details

In the following we will describe how we combined
approxis with approximate matching. The workflow of
data decoding and examination is depicted in Figure 5 and
can be described as a multi-layered process. Note, even
though the figure shows a clear separation between different
steps, most of them are strongly interleaved and therefore it

The previous section outlined a high level perspective of
the procedure where this section details about our concept.
As mentioned, we are using a multi-layered process which
is reflected by the usage of multiple buffers (buffers are
summarized in Table III). Most of the working buffers are
limited in its size and thus, have to be swapped during
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raw bytes
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Figure 5. Overview of the data processing steps. The process outlines the interleaved characteristics of the overall approach. We highlighted integrated
components of approxis and MRSH.

processing (i.e. buf_lo, buf_ro, buf_pe, buf_mn).
We skip the details of the buffer swapping for simplicity,
but recommend to consider the implementation as multiple
circular buffers. For the prototype (and hence for the runtime
performance evaluation) we expect that the input stream (i.e.
buf_by) can be stored in memory completely. For a better
understanding of the overall processing and the usage of
the mentioned buffers, we explain the procedure based on a
comprehensive example in the following section.
Figure 6 gives an example of how the different buffers are
utilized. The example shows 10 steps of processing, where
in each step a instruction is decoded from the byte buffer
(buf_by, by) at the highlighted offset ?. The decoded
instruction length and a corresponding mnemonic are saved
into separate buffers after each offset in buf_ro, ro
and buf_mn, mn, respectively. Thus, the current buffers
steadily increase with each decoded offset. For instance,
in row 1 the first seven bytes in the byte buffer are e8
00 00 00 00 83 2d. The disassembler decodes the first
six bytes to the mnemonic 114, which represents a call
instruction. The pointer moves to the next offset and repeats
the decoding process similar to the first row. Thus, in row
2, the next byte sequence 83 2d 00 00 00 00 01 gets
decoded to the mnemonic 91. Beside the mnemonic, we
again store the corresponding length of the instruction 7 in
the buffer ro. In the third row, we could see that the previous
pointer was increased by 7 and the process repeats with the
decoded instruction bytes 74 02.
Once the mnemonics are decoded, they are ‘added’ to our
sliding window, e.g., in row one the mnemonic 114 is the
first entry of the rolling hash. Given that the rolling hash has

a length of seven, the last seven mnemonics serve as input
for the PRF. As the amount of mnemonic representatives is
larger than 28 , the hash value is calculated over a sequence
of integers, which stores the mnemonic represents decoded
by approxis. As soon as the PRF determines a chunk
boundary (see the output of the PRF in row 5 and row 8
of Figure 6), the decoded instructions (buf_mn) are hashed
using the chunk hash function (CHF, FNV-1a algorithm
[12]). The hash value is then stored into the Bloom filter (the
hash value is separated into 5 sub-hashes where each sets a
bit of the Bloom filter; the procedure is identical to MRSH).
In Figure 6, we represent the hash values by a shortened
representation in the last column denoted as BF. The buffers
by and ro are cleared out after each chunk extraction (see
row 6 and 9 in Figure 6), where the sliding window of the
applied PRF keeps the buffer of the last 7 mnemonics for
the next decoding pass.
To filter code related chunks and to reduce the overall
amount of Bloom filter inserts, we utilizes the introduced
value of confidence for consecutive instructions (see Section II-C). Therefore, chunks are inserted into a Bloom filter
as soon as they fulfill two properties. First, the chunk size
has to contain at least 10 consecutive instructions. Second,
the overall amount of considerable meaningful mnemonic
bigrams has to be at least 30 % for a current chunk.
Hashing the decoded byte sequences (buf_mn) will for
example neglect all byte sequences which represent operand
information within an instruction. More importantly, different opcodes on a byte level can been mapped to the
same mnemonic representative. Besides hashing the decoded
instructions, one could also hash the other buffers. In this

No.
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by: ... 00 00 00 00 ?
ro:

2.
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4
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[]

[]

PRF(114 91 44 330) → 7

e8 00 00 00 00 e9 00 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 ...

[’c42’]

PRF(114 91 44 330 114) → 3

e9 00 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 00 00 00 00 ...

[’c42’]

PRF(114 91 44 330 114 115) → 7
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Figure 6. Example of the overall processing pass with different buffers of the raw buffer (by), the buffer of decoded offsets (ro) and the decoded
mnemonics (mn). The current decoded offset is denoted with ? and shifted by the amount ro after each step.

prototype, we actually propose the hashing of two buffers,
the decoded buffer of representatives (buf_mn) and the
original input buffer (buf_by). This empowers an investigator to detect similar instruction sequences and inspect
possible deviations on a byte level.
We summarize two central adaptations to the original
MRSH and approxis implementation. In contrary to previous bytewise approximate matching approaches, the chunk
boundaries are defined with the help of the decoded byte
sequences, not the byte sequences itself. Additionally, the
code detection is not performed within a fixed-sized sliding
window as proposed by Liebler and Baier [20], but rather
on a chunk level.
D. Configurable Parameters
An overview of the important configurable parameters is
given in the following subsection. We additionally give a
short explanation and reasoning of the parameters and the
selected default values. We will first describe the important parameters which define the overall chunk extraction
process. An overview of the parameters could be seen in
Table IV.
Selecting the feature (chunk) size (b): As already introduced, the PRF approximately defines the extracted chunk

sizes. Considering the minimum respected page size of 4KiB
and the presence of non-contiguous memory mappings, we
depict a default value of b = 64.
Code confidence: The process of filtering chunks, which
store code fragments, could be controlled by two parameters. The parameter CODE_THRESH describes the maximum
value of λ which defines two consecutive instructions to
be meaningful or not. The values of λ are stored within
the buffer buf_lo during a decoding pass. If less than
10 consecutive instructions are detected within a chunk, the
chunk will not be inserted into the Bloom filter. Additionally,
considering large chunks, we measure the total amount of
instructions within a chunk. We require at least 30 % of the
decoded instructions inside a chunk, before the chunk will
be inserted into the Bloom filter. We denote this threshold
of code coverage as parameter CODE_COV.
Penalties: The original implementation of approxis
considers large amount of repeating decoded mnemonics
as less meaningful. An example could be misleadingly
decoded sequences of non-allocated zero bytes or other
padding instructions (e.g., NOP instructions). The running
length counter of approxis counts subsequent similar
decoded mnemonics. As soon as the running length counter

Parameter
BLOCK_SIZE
CODE_THRESH

CODE_COV

Range

Default

Description

[0,1]

64

Defined modulus and approximated size of a chunk (b).

[0-100]

30

The value defines the threshold of code confidence. A sequence of
instructions should be considered as code fragments, as soon as the
value of confidence is lower than the defined CODE_THRESH.

[0-1]

0.3

Defines the minimum required percentage of code coverage within
a chunk, before it gets hashed and inserted into the Bloom filter.

Table IV
PARAMETERS OF THE MRSH-MEM IMPLEMENTATION .

instruction exceeds RLE_THRESH, a penalty is written into
the buffer buf_pe. The saved penalty is added to the
value of confidence stored in the buffer buf_lo afterwards.
Beside the threshold we additionally configure a factorial,
which decreases the current running length after a sequence
of similar mnemonics was interrupted. We increase the
RLE_DRAIN to respect the non-contiguous properties of
physical memory dumps.
Determining the Bloom filter size (m): In the former
section we described the idiosyncrasies and properties of
memory management. In this paragraph we explain the
parameter adaptations and the following impacts to the
needed Bloom filter size. For further details to the following
formulas we refer to Breitinger et al. [6]. We consider 8 GiB
as reasonable RAM size and select the expected input size
(s) to be s = 8 GiB.
With the expectation that a modulus b defines a trigger
point and thus the probability of a hit is reciprocally proportional to the average chunk size, we estimate the number
of extracted chunks n for a given input image with size s.
The calculation could be seen in equation 2.
n=

8 · 1024 · 220
s · 220
=
= 134, 217, 728
b
64

(2)

In Breitinger et al. [6] the authors mention that the choice
of k is limited by the used FNV-1a hash function. Thus, the
value of k is limited to 5 ≤ k ≤ 7. Similar to MRSH-NET
we choose the value of k to be k = 6. A single Bloom
filter of size 32 MiB could be used to monitor approximately
2 GiB of data, whereas as Bloom filter of size 2 GiB could
approximately monitor 100 GiB of data [4]. Obviously, the
filter has to be stored in memory during examination. Similar
to Breitinger and Baggili [4] we consider this size as still
manageable even on casual or mobile systems. To determine
the maximum needed size of the Bloom filter in dependency
to the expected input size, we depict the corresponding
formula from [6]. In addition, we set the parameter r, which
defines the minimum amount of correctly to be identified
consecutive features to r = 6. Considering equation 3 and
the above mentioned parameters, we propose a Bloom filter
size of m ≈ 7.0426 · 108 bits ≈ 84 MiB. An overview of the

configurable parameters could be seen in Table VI.
m=−

k·n
√ , where p = (1 − e−kn/m )k .
ln(1 − k·r p)

(3)

IV. A PPLICATION
The implementation of MRSH-NET uses a single, large
Bloom filter which bares two notable disadvantages: memory consumption and the lack of file identification, i.e., the
approach can only answer the question if a file is contained
in a given Bloom filter, but we cannot say to which file a
similarity exists. However, we decided to use the identical
approach for realizing the prototype; we will evaluate possible strategies in future research to match chunks with a
given file base.
The adaptation and integration of a single Bloom filter
(BF) gives us a good computational performance for initial
white- or blacklisting of extracted chunks. However, to perform the capabilities of better identification, we additionally
create a database of extracted chunk hash values (CHV).
The current chunk hash database (CHDB) consists of single
large lookup tree, which stores all chunk hash values with a
corresponding file name inside each leaf node. As we focus
on computational speed and expect better solutions for a fast
file identification, we do not consider the database in the case
of runtime performance analysis or memory consumption
(see Section VII for further discussions). Figure 7 provides
an overview of the general application. First, an investigator
has to acquire the dumps (memory and hard disk). Additionally, the acquisition of files from different repositories can
be considered. All input files are processed with MRSH-MEM
and stored in the Bloom filter as well as in a database of
known code fragments (CHDB). Applying MRSH-MEM on
the acquired memory dump will then answer the question
if a particular memory fragment is found in the BF. The
comparison against the database will allow to answer the
question which file was matched.
Note: Different versions of the same executable can share
the same code base. Thus, similar chunk hash values can
occur, which will be inserted into the Bloom filter digest.
Leaf nodes in our CHDB, which are occupied by chunks of

Parameter

Range

Default

Description

RLE_THRESH

[0-100]

10

Sets the threshold when the repeating sequences of instructions
should be considered as not valid.

RLE_DRAIN

[0.1-1.0]

0.9

The value defines a factorial, which lowers the running length
counter significantly faster. If the value is lower than the defined
threshold, we switch to stepwise decrementing the running length
counter.

Table V
PARAMETERS OF THE MRSH-MEM IMPLEMENTATION FOR CONTROLLING THE PROCESS OF DISASSEMBLING .

Parameter

Range

Default

Description

BF_SIZE_IN_BYTES

[0,X]

128 MiB

Size of the Bloom filter (b, must be a power of two).

SUBHASHES

[5,7]

6

Number of used subhashes (k).

MIN_RUN

[0,X]

6

Minimum amount of correctly to be identified consecutive
features (r).

Table VI
PARAMETERS OF THE MRSH-MEM IMPLEMENTATION .

multiple versions of an executable (e.g., the same chunks
have been extracted for multiple versions of a file) are
denoted in the following plot as multiple hits. Chunk hash
values, which only appeared for a single version, are marked
as single hits.
Test environment: For testing purposes, we acquired
memory and hard disk fragments from an existing Debian 8
installation, which was originally setup inside a virtualized
environment for common network analysis tasks. In detail,
we inspected a Debian 8 installation (Debian 3.16.7 x86 64
GNU/Linux) running with the help of Virtual Box (Version
5.2.6 r120293). The system contains several real world applications and was used for several weeks without a reboot.
To acquire the memory we used LiME8 (Linux Memory
Extractor) which is a Loadable Kernel Module for memory
acquisition. We inserted the module into the running Kernel
and acquired 2 GiB of the memory in raw format.
A. Identify present Linux Kernel Version
In our first application we identify the presence of Kernel
fragments and the Kernel version of the target system by
analyzing the acquired raw memory dump with MRSH-MEM.
This process can support further structured analysis and possibly enhance the task of profile determination. In our application we utilize a set of available Linux images of a public
Debian repository9 . The Kernel files (i.e., vmlinux/vmlinuz)
have been obtained by the corresponding deb-Packages, the
.text sections have been extracted and the images have
8 https://github.com/504ensicsLabs/LiME

(last accessed 2018-02-10).
(last accessed 2018-

9 http://ftp.us.debian.org/debian/pool/main/l/linux/

02-10).

been processed with MRSH-MEM. We additionally store the
extracted Linux Kernels and its corresponding chunk hash
values in our introduced CHDB. Subsequently, we query the
CHDB with 12 different Kernel images (see Table VII for
an overview of all inserted Linux Kernels).
While we expect that most of the Linux Kernels from the
repository share a reasonable amount of similar code chunks,
this can obviously vary for different versions. To determine
the actual Kernel version of our target system, we analyzed
the detected chunks in two ways. First, we determined the
total amount of detected chunks for each processed Kernel
version. Second, we examined those chunks, which are only
mapped to a single Kernel version by the CHDB and do not
share multiple of those chunks with other Kernel versions.
After performing the step of chunk identification with
MRSH-MEM, we additionally identified the related Kernel
version(s) for each chunk. The amount and distribution of
detected chunks by its corresponding kernel version(s) can
be seen in Figure 8. The statically linked Kernel images
share a reasonable amount of similar code fragments (bar
multiple). However, the actual Kernel version clearly occupies most of the extracted chunks and thus, we could
distinguish the present Kernel from the other images (see
column (9) in Figure 8). Next, we only considered chunks
which are mapped to a single Linux Kernel and do not count
shared code fragments between different versions, i.e., we
filter out identified chunks which are related to multiple
Kernels. The examination of distinct mapped chunks in
Figure 8 (bar single) underline the presence of our expected
Kernel version (vmlinuz-3.16.0-4-amd64).
Considerations: Discussing the examination of the Ker-
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Figure 8. The detected chunk sequences and the overall counts for each Kernel version. As could be seen, the present Kernel version of our target system,
i.e. vmlinux-3.2.0-4-amd64 (9), shows a significant amount of detected chunks.

nel .text section in memory leads to the question if
MRSH-MEM can be used for detecting advanced Kernel
infection techniques. Considering different hijacking techniques should lead to the presences of modifications in the
memory located version of the original Kernel. However,
the process of Kernel loading is quiet complex and the
Linux Kernel binaries could additional contain modification
instructions, i.e., alternative instructions, which patches the
original code during loading (.altinstructions10 ). At
this point we leave the question if MRSH-MEM is usable
for advanced code integrity checks of Linux Kernels unanswered for further research.
B. Identify Application in User Memory
As already introduced in Section II, the Kernel memory
mappings should be considered contiguous in most of the

cases. To determine the capabilities of our approach in
user space memory, we performed a task of process and
application identification. We inspected the raw memory
dump on the presences of application related code fragments. In detail, we acquired three different versions of the
Wireshark Protocol Analyzer11 from a Debian repository12
(see Table VIII). The acquired ELFs were dynamically
linked and stripped. We extracted the allocable .text
sections of the different executables and processed them with
MRSH-MEM, where each executable approximately contained
4130 chunks. Again, the chunks were also inserted into the
CHDB for the evaluation of single and multiple hits.
We ensured that an instance of Wireshark 1.12.1 was running at the time of memory acquisition. Figure 9 illustrates
11 https://www.wireshark.org/

(last accessed 2018-02-10).

12 http://ftp.us.debian.org/debian/pool/main/w/wireshark/
10 https://lwn.net/Articles/531148/

(last accessed 2018-02-10).

2018-02-10).

(last accessed

ID
(1)
(4)
(7)
(10)

Kernel
3.2.0-4-amd64
4.14.0-0.bpo.3-amd64
4.15.0-rc8-amd64
4.14.0-3-rt-amd64

ID
(2)
(5)
(8)
(11)

Kernel
4.13.0-0.bpo.1-amd64
3.2.0-4-rt-amd64
4.14.0-0.bpo.2-amd64
3.16.0-0.bpo.4-amd64

ID
(3)
(6)
(9)
(12)

Kernel
4.14.0-0.bpo.2-rt-amd64
4.14.0-3-amd64
3.16.0-4-amd64
4.14.0-0.bpo.3-rt-amd64

Table VII
E XTRACTED L INUX K ERNEL IMAGES FROM THE D EBIAN REPOSITORY ( MARKED WITH AN IDENTIFIER ). T HE ACTUAL PRESENT K ERNEL IN THE
EXTRACTED MEMORY IMAGE IS HIGHLIGHTED (9).

the capabilities of detecting and discriminating a running (or
formerly running) application in memory, where the amount
of single occupied chunks (1766) clearly identifies the actual
running Wireshark version (1.12.1).
To investigate possible false positives and to examine the
discrimination between a running and not running process
we repeated the procedure after rebooting the system. Thus,
we were not expecting to find presence of Wireshark.
The results are shown in Figure 10 and indicate very low
numbers / matches. Precisely, the bars show some hits in
the case of multiple occupied chunks. To lower the values
of false positives, we propose the adaptation and increase of
the MIN_RUN parameter. We additional suggest a minimum
required chunk size, as most of the false positives were
smaller than 40 bytes.
C. Runtime performance
In the following paragraph we examine the runtime efficiency of MRSH-MEM. In detail, we measured the runtime for
disassembling, chunk extraction, chunk hashing and Bloom
filter handling. Note, we differentiate between Bloom filter
creation and Bloom filter lookup. As mentioned in the
original paper of approxis [20], the processed byte sequences can significantly influence the overall disassembling
performance. Therefore, similar to Liebler and Baier [20] we
study the runtime performance for three different images: a
concatenated set of 64 bit ELF binaries, a raw memory dump
acquired with LiME and a random sequence of bytes. Lastly,
we removed all unnecessary functionalities (e.g., printout
mechanisms) and compiled our binary with an optimization
set to O213 .
The efficiency test was performed on a Lenovo Thinkpad
x250 with a Intel Core i5 2x 2,2 GHz and 8 GB RAM.
The performance of the built in Solid State Drive was also
determined, where the read performance was 508 MB/s and
the write performance was 513 MB/s. The overall results
are shown in Table IX. The column of chunks defines the
amount of triggered chunk boundaries for each image and
for one pass.
Considerations: The current implementation shows further potential for improving the overall runtime performance.

So far, our current implementation does not consider any
additional steps of previous data filtration steps (e.g. the
usage of entropy analysis). In addition, it should be mentioned that the current processing does not consider any
parallelization and the introduced approach empowers to
concurrently process the input memory images.
V. R ELATED W ORK
The application of a YARA14 rules for the examination of
memory was recently discussed by Cohen [9]. The author
described a context-aware scanning scheme on the physical
address space using the Windows PFN database, which
could be used to map each physical page to a corresponding
process. By the examination of physical memory dumps,
the approach still gains a reasonable performance, which is
caused by an optimized IO throughput. In contrary to the
application on hard disk, the authors discuss the applicability, expandability and the adaptations of pattern matching
rules in the course of memory analysis.
White et al. [30] and Walters et al. [29] discussed identifying known code sequences by applying cryptographic hash
functions. Therefore, memory pages containing code fragments are first normalized, before they are further processed.
The offsets which have to be normalized have been saved
into a database of hash templates; consisting of hash values
and the corresponding offsets. After identifying a process in
the Virtual Memory Space, the hash templates are selected
by extracted process informations from the memory dump
itself. White et al. [30] improved the costly lookup process,
which was first introduced by Walters et al. [29], where the
comparison between each template and each page in the
Physical Address Space leads to a complexity of O(n ∗ m)
for a comparison of n templates against m memory pages.
A virtual PE Loader was created to perform the process
of binary lifting and to extract the variable memory offsets
in the executable. A public available Volatility plugin15
provides a whitelisting similar to White et al. [30]. The
approach performs a lookup on a page level of executables.
Therefore, the memory is processed and sent to a hash server.
In contrary to [30], the lifting of the code is performed on
14 https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara

13 https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Optimize-Options.html

accessed 2018-02-10).

(last

(last accessed 2018-02-10).

15 https://github.com/K2/Scripting/blob/master/inVteroJitHash.py

accessed 2018-02-10).
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Figure 9. Examination of a memory dump of our target system
meanwhile Wireshark was running (ELF executable amd64; version
1.12.1).
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Figure 10. Memory dump of our target system after rebooting the
virtual machine and thus, without a running Wireshark instance.

Version
2.4.4-1 amd64
2.2.6+g32dac6a-2+deb9u2 amd64
1.12.1+g01b65bf-4+deb8u13 amd64

Table VIII
L IST OF EXTRACTED W IRESHARK VERSIONS . T HE ACTUAL RUNNING VERSION IS HIGHLIGHTED (3).

Execution time
insert lookup
46.0s
48.0s
50.0s
50.0s
197.0s 192.0s

Chunks
6,887,955
1,608,674
10,537,710

Description
Concatenated set of 64bit binaries from /usr/bin
Raw memory dump acquired with LiME
Random sequences of bytes generated with /dev/urandom

Table IX
I NSERT AND LOOKUP RUNTIME PERFORMANCE OF MRSH-MEM FOR DIFFERENT INPUT IMAGES .

the server, which creates integrity hashes with the help of
the virtual address of the process on the client.
Ligh et al. [21] introduced a script (ssdeep_procs),
which enumerates running processes on a system, dumps
them to hard disk and compares the extracted executables
with the help of ssdeep [19]. The Volatility plugin called
impfuzzy16 applies Fuzzy Hashing on the Import API
of PE files to detect malicious changes. However, most of
the mentioned approaches are context-aware and fall into
the category of structured analysis where we have already
mentioned the advantages, disadvantages and conceptional
differences. In contrary to the introduced approaches, our
approach aims to extend current techniques of unstructured
analysis and the creation of new forms of data driven cross
validation.
Different authors mentioned or questioned the application
of approximate matching in the course of memory forensics
16 https://github.com/JPCERTCC/aa-tools/tree/master/impfuzzy (last accessed 2018-02-10).

[30, 22]. In the specific case of matching executables in
memory to its counterpart loaded in memory, most of
the authors doubt the usefulness of applying approximate
matching on the raw sequences in memory. One major
reason are legitimate changes to the code sequences caused
by the loading process itself. Similar to White et al. [30]
and Walters et al. [29] we propose an additional step of
normalization by previously disassembling detected code
sequences. This is accomplished with the utilization of an
approximate disassembler [20].
The term approximate disassembling describes the rough
disassembling of unknown code sequences and was, to the
best of our knowledge, first mentioned by Shah [27]. The
authors focused on a fast and rough disassembling of a
code base as preceding step of machine learning based
classification tasks. Therefore, they first analyzed the Most
Frequent Occurred (MFO) instructions of executable files
similar to Bilar [1]. By disassembling a large set of PE
executables with the help of IDA Pro, a frequency analysis

of subsequent MFO instruction pairs was performed. The
statistical examination was used for creating a solution tree,
which could be used to select the most plausible next
offsets inside a byte stream. The approach resolves multiple
possible paths by examining the statistical probability of
different byte offsets inside a byte stream. The approach
was called to be 20 % faster than IDA Pro. However, no
computational performance was made against a linear sweep
disassembler, as those are known to be faster than a recursive
traversal based disassembler like IDA Pro. Additionally,
comparing the computational performance could be misleading, as IDA Pro outreaches the capabilities of approximate
disassembling. The approach was only tested for small files
with a size from one to five megabytes.
Considering the field of memory forensics and its introduced conditions, we inspected approaches that are related to
our task of identifying fragmented code structures. Garfinkel
and McCarrin [13] introduced an approach called hashbased carving which aims at identifying fragmented files,
files that are incomplete, or files that have been partially
modified. The approach is mainly considered in the field
of sector-based volumes and the sliding window based
extraction is sized to 4 KiB. The overall process is computational demanding but highly parallelizable. The authors
make use of a previously introduced hashdb [31] and outline
their real-world experience by the utilization of hash-based
carving. A major contribution of the work is the discussion
of classifying blocks and the negative impact of common
blocks, which are shared between documents. Their work
shows the problem of a high false identification rate caused
by large amounts of shared blocks within the processed
document classes. As our work focuses on the adaption of
approximate matching into the field of memory forensics
and as we propose a more context-related extraction of
chunks by adopting fundamentals of an implementation
called MRSH-NET [4, 5], we address the process of a
better chunk identification and resolving a corresponding
executables as a future task.
VI. C ONCLUSION
Approximate matching techniques are known among the
digital forensics community and have been utilized in different fields of application. Current implementations empower
to whitelist or identify fragments of data in the field of
classical disk or network forensics. The application of approximate matching on memory bares several pitfalls. Similar to other unstructured analysis techniques, our introduced
approach has to consider several idiosyncrasies of inspecting
the physical memory space. Therefore, we first discussed
those considerations and limitations.
We introduced a new specimen of approximate matching (MRSH-MEM), by interfacing approximate matching
(MRSH-NET) with an additional step of approximate disassembling (approxis). We described the implementation

details of merging both techniques as well as the needed
adaptations and changed parameter settings. The integration
of an additional step of disassembling stabilizes the original
bytewise application, as our approach works on disassembled and thus, normalized instruction sequences. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first implementation, which
interfaces approximate matching with an additional step of
approximate disassembling.
We showed the feasibility of our approach by comparing a
memory dump against code fragments gained from different
resources, i.e., code extracted from a hard disk as well
as a repository. Our introduced approach detects allocable
code fragments without the need of manual inspecting an
executable or the manual definition of any matching rules.
Our first prototype empowers to easily create a database of
different applications and perform the examination of raw
memory dumps. As former publications claimed approximate matching to be slow, we showed that our current prototype achieves a good computational performance, without
the usage of any parallelization.
Our current implementation, which is written in C, could
be shipped as a Python Extension for easy use and integration. We consider our implementation in different fields
of application and see further potential of extending existing Memory Forensics Frameworks, which are also mostly
written in Python.
VII. F UTURE WORK
There are four major aspects we will address. First, the
process of saving and identifying files will be improved.
The current implementation of the chunk hash database
(CHDB) and the usage of a single Bloom filter shows
promising results. However, an advanced database should be
considered, which empowers to actually identify and name
a specific fragment found in memory. A general discussion
of this task was already started by Garfinkel and McCarrin
[13] and the authors showed major challenges caused by
shared blocks across different samples of a specific file type,
e.g., office documents. As we process executable sections of
code, different results should be expected which requires
the reassessment of a chunk based file identification in
our specific field of application. A promising candidate for
further developments could be the adaptation and integration
of Hierarchical Bloom Filter Trees (HBFT) [23] or the
utilization of already introduced hash databases [31].
Second, the process of chunk hashing should be further
investigated. The extraction of chunks based on mnemonic
representatives or the original byte sequences itself, could be
further extended by other types of intermediate representations. This should allow to perform additional steps of investigation, as the current approximated state of disassembling
is useful for the fast detection of similarities but gives less
insights into the performed instructions and their meaning.

Third, the core of MRSH-MEM is written in C to gain
the best runtime performance. However, an integration into
one of the public available memory forensics frameworks is
possible, as we propose an integration as Python Extension.
Further applications and the creation of new extensions will
be considered, e.g., the development of advanced integrity
checks. Our approach may also be used to extend current
frameworks and the process of structural analysis. A first
application could be the integration of data driven cross
validation functionalities, e.g., by enumerating an identified
process by its original and disk-placed disassembled codebase. As already outlined, the task of code integrity checks is
an interesting application, e.g., for advanced Kernel integrity
checks. However, this application needs additional research
and engineering effort.
Finally, as our current approach only focuses on code in
memory, we will investigate the capabilities of identifying
non-code related structures. As we perform a single pass
over the complete image, this should not lead to a significant
runtime overhead.
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